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A ROADBLOCK ON THE DETOUR AROUND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: IS THE ENFORCEMENT OF ENGLISH LIBEL
JUDGMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
I. INTRODUCTION
The possibility of a libel suit has always threatened the
American media. As American companies continue to canvas the
globe,1 however, the possibility of an unfavorable libel judgment
looms even larger. Due to the fact that Americans dominate the
dissemination of information, 2 an ever-increasing number of libel
suits are being filed against the American media in England.3 To
make matters worse, the English justice system fails to provide the
minimum level of protection for speech and press required by the
First Amendment to the United States Constitution.4
Because these media defendants' assets are primarily located
in the United States, many victorious libel plaintiffs seek to collect
on the English judgments in United States courts. 5 Therefore, the
question arises whether the United States should enforce English
libel judgments in light of England's deficiencies in protecting the
freedoms of speech and press.
A New York court was the first to attempt to answer this
question in the 1992 case of Bachchan v. India Abroad
Publications, Inc.6 In Bachchan, a London correspondent for an
American news service wrote a story concerning the bribing of
Indian public officials. 7 The story fingered an Indian businessman,
Ajitabh Bachchan, as the owner of a Swiss bank account, which
the Indian government suspected was used to funnel illegal
1. See Kyu Ho Youm, Suing American Media in Foreign Courts: Doing an End-Run
Around U.S. Libel Law?, 16 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 235, 236 (1994) [hereinafter
Suing American Media].
2. See id
3. See id. at 237.
4. See Gregory T. Walters, Bachchan v. India Abroad Publications, Inc.: The Clash
Between Protection of Free Speech in the United States and Great Britain, 16 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 895, 896-98 (1993).
5. See id. at 914-15.
6. 585 N.Y.S.2d 661 (1992).
7. See id.
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payments to Indian politicians.8 Bachchan sued the American
news service in England's High Court of Justice. 9 After a trial, an
English jury found the American corporation to be responsible for
defaming Bachchan.10 Due to the fact the Bachchan could not
collect on the judgment in England, he requested that a New York
trial court enforce the English libel judgment against the American
news service in the United States.11  The court feared that
enforcement of the judgment would threaten the free speech
protections 12 found in the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. 13 Ultimately, the court refused to recognize or
enforce the libel judgment on the grounds that it would be adverse
to the public policy of New York and the United States.14
The 1995 case of Matusevich v. Telnikoff 5 relied on
Bachchan in refusing to enforce another English libel judgment in
the United States. 16 In Matusevich, a Maryland federal court
found that enforcement of a libel judgment from a country that did
not incorporate American defamation standards was repugnant to
the public policy of Maryland and the United States.17
In view of the growing number of individuals seeking
enforcement of English libel judgments in the United States,' 8
many arguments have been made as to why the American
Judiciary should or should not enforce these judgments. However,
the true focus should be on whether it is constitutionally
permissible to enforce an English libel judgment in the United
States. This Comment argues that under the First Amendment to
the United States Constitution and some views of the "state
action" doctrine, the American enforcement of English libel
judgments is itself unconstitutional.
8. See id.
9. See Robert L. Spellman, "Spitting in the Queen's Soup": The Refusal of American
Courts to Enforce Foreign Libel Judgments, COMM. & LAW 63, 66 (1994).
10. See Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 661.
11. See id.
12. See id.
13. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (providing that "Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press.").
14. See Bachchan, 585 N.Y.S.2d at 665.
15. 877 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1995).
16. See id.
17. See id. at 2.
18. See Robin Pogrebin, Libel Gripes G6 Offshore; London a Town Named Sue, N.Y.
OBSERVER, Sept. 23, 1991, at 1.
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Part II of this Comment explores the differences between
English and American defamation standards. Part III discusses
the process of enforcing a foreign judgment in the United States
through the Full Faith and Credit Clause, comity, and the Uniform
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. Part IV examines
the American constitutional requirement of "state action" and
focuses on its application to judicial acts. Part V applies the "state
action" theory to the enforcement of English libel judgments in a
United States court. Finally, Part VI concludes that if "state
action" is found in the enforcement of English libel judgments,
enforcement of such judgments violates the freedoms guaranteed
by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
II. ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LIBEL LAW COMPARED
The vast differences between the defamation principles of
England and the United States are the cause of this constitutional
quandary. While both countries value freedom of speech and the
press,19 England does not value these freedoms on a level
commensurate with the United States. In particular, England
protects an individual's reputation over such freedoms through its
plaintiff-friendly libel laws.20 As a result of these laws, speech that
would be protected under the constitutional principles of the
United States could form the basis for a libel judgment in England.
A. The English Common Law Standards
Current English common law requires that three elements be
satisfied before a libel judgment can be established. First, the
defendant must have published the challenged statement. Second,
the context of the statement must make the plaintiff identifiable to
others. Third, the challenged statement must indeed be libelous.
21
In England, a libelous statement is one that a reasonable person
would find to be destructive to the subject's reputation.22
19. See Suing American Media, supra note 1, at 239.
20. See id at 240.
21. See Michael Superstone, Press Law in the United Kingdom, in PRESS LAW IN
MODERN DEMOCRACIES 34 (Lahav Pnina ed., Longman 1985).
22. See Spellman, supra note 9, at 68.
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Under English common law, however, a plaintiff is not
required to prove the falsity of a challenged statement, because
that falsity is presumed by all English courts.23 Additionally, a
plaintiff need not show that he or she suffered an actual monetary
injury.24 The English common law presumes that the plaintiff
suffers some form of monetary loss.
25
Further, English common law does not require a plaintiff to
prove the defendant had the intent to defame. 26 Very simply, the
culpability of the defendant is not at issue. For this reason, libel in
England is considered to be a strict liability tort.27 Therefore, "the
strict liability of the tort forces journalists to be guarantors of the
truth of what they publish. ' '2
8
Although truth is a complete defense to a charge of libel
under English common law,29 defendants rarely claim this defense
for two reasons. First, because all defamatory statements are
presumed false in England, the burden of proving truth falls upon
the defendant. Second, if the libel defendant reaffirms in court
that the charged statement is true, yet the sitting court finds
otherwise, the judiciary has the authority to penalize the defendant
by increasing a money judgment.
30
B. The Constitutional Standard of the United States
From the time of America's founding to the mid-twentieth
century, United States courts followed the English common law
principles of defamation.31 In adopting England's strict liability
theory, 32 an early United States Supreme Court took the view that
"[w]hatever a man publishes, he publishes at his peril.
''33
Moreover, in 1942, the Supreme Court found no conflict between
23. See Suing American Media, supra note 1, at 240.
24. See Jeff Sanders, Extraterritorial Application of the First Amendment to
Defamation Claims Against American Media, 19 N.C. J. INT'L. L. & COM. REG. 515, 517
(1994).
25. See id. at 518.
26. See Suing American Media, supra note 1, at 241.
27. See id. at 240.
28. Spellman, supra note 9, at 67.
29. See id. at 68.
30. See id.
31. See ANTHONY LEWIS, MAKE No LAW: THE SULLIVAN CASE AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 156 (1991).
32. See id.
33. Peck v. Tribune Co., 214 U.S. 185, 189 (1909) (quoting Lord Mansfield in The
King v. Woodfall, Lofft, 98 Eng. Rep. 914, 916 (1774)).
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the English common law of libel and the First Amendment
freedoms found in the United States Constitution because the First
Amendment simply did not apply to libelous speech.34
The Supreme Court, however, retrenched twenty-two years
later in the landmark libel case of New York Times Company v.
Sullivan.35 In Sullivan, a New York newspaper criticized the
alleged discriminatory acts of Alabama politicians. 36 The Court
held that, in the case of public officials, "libel can claim no
talismanic immunity from constitutional limitations. It must be
measured by standards that satisfy the First Amendment. '37
As support for its break with the English common law, the
Sullivan Court cited "a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include vehement,
caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks .... "38 The
Court ultimately found that the application of strict liability to the
tort of libel conflicted with the First Amendment, and necessitated
elimination because a "rule compelling the critic of official conduct
to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions ... leads to...
'self-censorship."' 39
By abolishing strict liability libel, the Supreme Court created
a culpability requirement necessary to deem a statement
libelous.40 The Court stated that:
[C]onstitutional guarantees require . . . a federal rule that
prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he
proves that the statement was made with "actual malice" - that
is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not.41
This culpability requirement has come to be known as the "actual
malice" standard.
42
34. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
35. 315 U.S. 254 (1964).
36. See id. at 256.
37. Id. at 269.
38. Id. at 270.
39. Id. at 279.
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The actual malice standard made two substantial changes to
the common law of libel. First; it added a degree of culpability to
the English common law by requiring a public plaintiff to show
that the defendant intended to publish either a false statement or a
statement with a reckless disregard for the truth. Second, the new
standard shifted the burden of proof on the issue of falsity by
requiring a public plaintiff to establish that a challenged statement
is indeed false. 4
3
Although these newly-created libel standards contrasted
sharply with the English common law, the Supreme Court
recognized that the new standards were not only constitutionally
mandated, but also necessary in a democratic society. "By
imposing heightened burdens on public officials who bring
defamation claims against their critics, the law facilitates the
government-monitoring function of the press." 44 Had the Court
fashioned a stricter rule than that announced in Sullivan, freedom
of speech would essentially be reduced to speech that was believed
to be true to a legal certainty.45 If this were the case, many
governmental actions would go unquestioned by the press and the
public.
In later years, the Supreme Court augmented the Sullivan
ruling in its libel cases by extending some of Sullivan's
requirements to private plaintiffs.46 In Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,47 for example, the Supreme Court found that the First
Amendment is violated when states apply strict liability to libel
actions brought by private individuals.48  The Gertz case
"constitutionalized much of the law of defamation that relates to
private plaintiffs, so that today each of the common-law rules (and
any legislated variants) must be scrutinized under the First
Amendment's guarantee of freedom .... " 49 The Court, however,
allowed the states to choose any level of culpability below strict
43. See Suing American Media, supra note 1, at 242-43.
44. Sanders, supra note 24, at 520.
45. See id.
46. See Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Curtis Publishing v. Associated Press, 388 U.S. 130
(1967).
47. 418 U.S. 323.
48. See id at 347.
49. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 1083-84 (Little,
Brown, and Company, 6th ed. 1995).
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liability.50 Since the Gertz ruling, most states have chosen a
negligence standard.
51
The Gertz Court also addressed and dismantled England's
presumed injury rule.52 After Gertz, a plaintiff's injury from a
defamatory statement could no longer be presumed.53 The Court
required the showing of an actual injury and that "all awards.., be
supported by competent evidence.
'" 54
Twenty-two years later, Sullivan was further extended in
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps.55 Writing for the majority,
Justice O'Connor stated that private plaintiffs, like public figures,
must prove that a statement of public concern was actually false
before a prima facie libel claim could be established.
56
Thus, Gertz and Hepps implant two of Sullivan's
requirements into libel suits involving private plaintiffs. First,
Gertz requires some form of intent on the part of the publisher to
disseminate a false statement before a statement of public concern
is deemed libelous. Second, Hepps requires private plaintiffs to
prove that statements of public concern are actually false before
recovering damages.
In sum, there are vast differences between the English
common law of libel and the constitutional law of the United
States in the area libel and defamation.57  Three striking
50. See id.
51. See Spellman, supra note 9, at 70.
52 See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 349-50.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 350.
55. 475 U.S. 767.
56. See id. at 775.
57. A "real life" example of the differences between libel law in England and the
United States occurred in the wake of Princess Diana's death. A cloud of controversy
surrounded the publication of a book entitled THE ROYALS. The book highlighted many
intimate details about England's Royal Family, such as Queen Elizabeth II's insatiable sex
drive, Prince Philip's many extra-marital affairs, and Princess Diana's bad breath.
Interestingly enough, the book was not published or sold in England, although it was
published and sold in America. Due to England's plaintiff-friendly libel laws, the
publication of the book in England would have exposed the publisher to a legal nightmare.
It is likely that an English court would find the book's content defamatory, especially after
Princess Diana's death. Moreover, because the English common law presumes that a
defamatory statement is false, the publisher would have to prove the truth of each
assertion in order to escape liability. In the United States, however, the Royal Family
would have to prove that the book's assertions were indeed false, and published with
knowledge of their falsity or a reckless disregard for the truth in order to succeed in a libel
suit against the publisher. Obviously, the publisher was more comfortable with the
American scenario. See Dana Kennedy, Making Book, ENT. WKLY., Sept. 26, 1997, at 8.
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differences between the two systems exist: (i) the libel plaintiff in
the United States must prove that the challenged statement was
published with some knowledge of falsity, while the English
common law employs a strict liability standard; (ii) the libel
plaintiff in the United States must prove that the statement is
indeed false, while the English common law presumes falsity; and
(iii) the libel plaintiff in the United States must show actual
damage from the challenged statement, while the English common
law presumes that the libelous statement causes monetary damage.
Obvious in these differences is the reconciliation of an
interest in protecting reputation with that of protecting freedoms
of speech and press.58 "The disagreement begins with how the
balance should be struck. Roughly speaking, the common law has
set its.., presumption in favor of reputation, while the Supreme
Court has set its in favor of freedom of speech" 59 and press.
Because it is impossible to fully serve both interests, the common
law of England and the constitutional law of the United States are
fundamentally at odds with one another.
III. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT, COMITY, AND THE UNIFORM
FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION AcT
The enforcement of a foreign judgment in a United States
court is controlled by three main doctrines: (i) the Full Faith and
Credit Clause; (ii) comity; and (iii) the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act.
A. The Full Faith and Credit Clause
Once a plaintiff wins a money judgment in any state or
federal court of the United States, that judgment may be enforced
in any other state or federal court with relative ease.60 The Full
Faith and Credit Clause of the United States Constitution,61 and
the legislation implementing it,62 guarantee that judgments handed
58. See EPSTEIN, supra note 49, at 1084.
59. Id.
60. See Jeremy Maltby, Juggling Comity and Self-Government The Enforcement of
Foreign Libel Judgments in U.S. Courts, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1978, 1983-84 (1994).
61. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (stating that "[flull Faith and Credit shall be given in
each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
state .... ").
62. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988) (stating that "[a]cts, records, and judicial proceedings.
shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States ... as
[Vol. 21:159
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down in United States courts will be enforced in all other state and
federal courts. 63 A state may only refuse to enforce a judgment in
very limited circumstances.
64
The Full Faith and Credit Clause, however, does not apply to
foreign country judgments. Accordingly, foreign judgments lack
the conclusive effect of judgments entered in the United States.
65
Therefore, other legal doctrines and theories are applicable to the
enforcement of English libel judgments.
B. Comity
Although recognition of foreign judgments is not required by
the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court has employed
the notion of comity to give effect to such judgments.66 The roots
of comity are embedded in the landmark case of Hilton v. Guyot.
67
In Hilton, a French company attempted to enforce a French
judgment against American citizens in a United States court.
68
The Hilton Court framed and defined the theory of comity for the
first time:
'Comity,' in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will,
upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation
allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial
acts of another nation, having due regard both to international
duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
69
The Hilton Court's definition of comity created a guideline
for the enforcement of foreign judgments. Moreover, it created
three restrictions on the enforcement of such judgments: (i)
procedural restrictions; (ii) reciprocity restrictions; and (iii) public
they have by law in the courts of such state.., from which they are taken.").
63. See Rachel B. Korsower, Matusevitch v. Telnikoff. The First Amendment Travels
Abroad, Preventing the Recognition and Enforcement of a British Libel Judgment, 19 MD.
J. INT'L L. & TRADE 225,233-34 (1995).
64. See Maltby, supra note 60, at 1984 (A judgment's enforcement can be refused if
the forum court did not have personal jurisdiction, there was inadequate notice, or the
court did not have the requisite subject matter jurisdiction); see also Korsower, supra note
.63, at 233.
65. See Maltby, supra note 60, at 1984.
66. See Korsower, supra note 63, at 235.
67. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
68. See id. at 114.
69. Id. at 163-64.
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policy restrictions.
1. Procedural Restrictions on Comity
As defined by the Court in Hilton, comity is an extremely
malleable legal doctrine. However, the Hilton Court did place
some procedural restrictions on this otherwise vague recognition
theory:
[WIhere there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial
abroad before a court of competent jurisdiction, conducting the
trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation or voluntary
appearance of the defendant, and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of
justice . . . and there is nothing to show either prejudice in the
court, or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or
fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special reason
why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the
merits of the case should not.., be tried afresh .... 70
The Hilton Court thus recognized several procedural factors
that can halt the enforcement of a foreign judgment in a United
States court-"lack of jurisdiction, partiality, fraud, or lack of
notice or due process."
71
2. The Reciprocity Restriction on Comity
Ultimately, the Hilton Court refused to enforce the French
judgment, not because of any of the above-mentioned procedural
concerns, but due to a lack of reciprocity. 72 The Court noted that
an individual's attempt to enforce a United States judgment in
France would likely fail because the French judiciary would rehear
the case without respecting the judgment of the American court.73
Thus, the Hilton Court held that the notion of comity did not apply
to French judgments because "international law is founded upon
mutuality and reciprocity," 74 which was lacking with France.
Ultimately, in addition to the procedural restrictions on
comity, the Hilton ruling also required the forum nation to practice
reciprocity, a deferential policy towards the enforcement of United
States judgments.
70. Id. at 202-03.
71. Maltby, supra note 60, at 1985.





3. Public Policy Restrictions on Comity
The procedural and reciprocity requirements were not the
only comity issues considered in Hilton. The Court also
considered the enforcing state's public policy as a further
restriction on the enforcement of a foreign judgment. 75 Hilton
establishes that when the enforcing state's public policy is offended
by the forum court's ruling, the judgment cannot have conclusive
effect. Therefore, the enforcement of a foreign judgment must
also depend on "the condition of the country in which the foreign
law is sought to be enforced, the particular nature of her
legislation, her policy, and her character .... ")76
The public policy requirement was defined by then-New York
Judge Cardozo in Loucks v. Standard Oil.77 Judge Cardozo stated
that it was a court's duty not to enforce a foreign judgment when
enforcement would "violate some fundamental principle of justice,
some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted
tradition of the common wealth."
'78
The public policy exception was employed in Barry E. v.
Ingraham.79 In Barry E., the New York Court of Appeals refused
to recognize an adoption judgment from Mexico. The court based
its opinion on the belief that the Mexican court did not sufficiently
investigate the welfare of the child, and that enforcing an adoption
judgment without considering the child's best interest was against
New York's public policy.80 The court feared that the automatic
enforcement of foreign adoption proceedings could lead to the
"mercenary trading of children." 81
The Supreme Court has never held that the federal standards
of comity, created in Hilton, bind the states in their enforcement of
foreign judgments.82 Most states have nevertheless used the
criteria announced in Hilton to create their own legislation
75. See id. at 164-65.
76. Id.
77. 120 N.E. 198 (N.Y. 1918).
78. Id. at 202.
79. 371 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1977).
80. See id at 496.
81. Id.
82. The Supreme Court has never explicitly ruled that federal law governs the
enforcement of foreign judgments, which has allowed states to legislate on their own. See
R. Doak Bishop & Susan Burnette, United States-Practice Concerning the Recognition of
Foreign Judgments, 16 INT'L LAW 425,429 (1982).
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regarding the enforcement of foreign judgments.83 Other states
have retained the Hilton requirements by enacting a form of the
Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
(Recognition Act).84
C. The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act
The Recognition Act,85 which is basically a codification of the
Hilton ruling,86 has been voluntarily adopted by some states. Its
purpose was to reconcile the states' diverse practices regarding the
review of foreign judgments under their common law standards.87
Uniformity was needed to guide other countries in determining
whether their judgments would be enforced in the United States.88
Although the United States was one of the more liberal countries
on enforcement, each state seemed to interpret Hilton
differently. 89 This divergence in foreign judgment review led to a
lack of United States reciprocity, which put American judgments
abroad in jeopardy. 90 The Recognition Act, thus, was intended to
provide uniformity in enforcement so as to dissolve this reciprocity
predicament.
The Recognition Act provides courts with the discretion to
refuse the enforcement of a foreign judgment if the Hilton
procedural restrictions are not met,91 or if Hilton's public policy
restrictions are violated.92 Therefore, even though states vary as
to whether they have incorporated Hilton into their common law
or enacted a version of the Recognition Act, the standards by
which states consider the enforcement of foreign judgments are
relatively similar.93
83. A majority of states still use the Hilton requirements in creating foreign judgment
recognition legislation. See id. at 430.
84. See Maltby, supra note 60, at 1986-87.
85. UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT, 13 U.L.A. 261 (1962).
86. See Maltby, supra note 60, at 1987.
87. See Korsower, supra note 63, at 237-38.
88. See id. at 237.
89. See id. at 237-38.
90. See id.
91. See UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT § 4(a)(1)(3), 13
U.L.A. 261 (1962).
92. See id. § 4(b)(1)(6).
93. There is an exception. The reciprocity requirement, invoked in Hilton, has not
gained wide acceptance by the states. In fact, only seven states have a standard that allows
courts to deny recognition of a foreign judgment due to a lack of reciprocity from the
forum nation. See Korsower, supra note 63, at 236.
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Ultimately, however, a foreign judgment's fate depends on a
state's interpretation of standards, such as partiality, fraud, and
due process. Furthermore, a state court must entangle itself in the
enforcement of a foreign judgment by deciding if it is inconsistent
with the state's public policy. This entanglement raises the
question of whether a state's conduct constitutes state action,
making the Constitution and its Amendments applicable to the
substance of the judgment.
IV. THE STATE ACTION DOCTRINE
A. Introduction to the State Action Doctrine
With the exception of the Thirteenth Amendment, 94 the
United States Constitution and its Amendments only operate to
restrain governmental action. 95 The Bill of Rights (the first ten
Amendments to the Constitution) limits the actions of the federal
government. 96 The Fourteenth Amendment expressly restrains
the states from infringing upon the liberties created by the Bill of
Rights.97  However, the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment do not restrain purely private action.98 Thus, a suit
alleging a constitutional violation must prove that some form of
"state action" was involved in the violation.99 In order for state
action to be present, there must be a finding that the act or
conduct challenged is an act by the state.100 "For example, while a
public school may not discriminate on the basis of race by virtue of
the Equal Protection Clause, there is no such constitutional
limitation on the activities of a purely private school. The reason
is simple: a private school is not the state." 10 1
94. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery in both
the public and private spheres.
95. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1688 (2nd ed.
1988) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
96. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 156 (1986) [hereinafter ROTUNDA].
97. See id. at 159.
98. See id. at 156.
99. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 95.
100. The phrase "state action", reflects the fact that most cases involving the doctrine
concern the Fourteenth Amendment and the actions of a state. The phrase, however, also
includes actions of the federal government. See ROTUNDA, supra note 96, at 151.
101. CHRIS N. MAY & ALAN IDES, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, EXAMPLES AND
EXPLANATIONS 13 (Aspen Law & Business) (1998) [hereinafter MAY & IDES].
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Often, the requirement of state action is easily met and is a
non-issue, particularly when the state is an active participant in a
constitutional violation.10 2 For example, if a litigant challenges a
state statute claiming that it violates his or her constitutional
rights, the state is an obvious participant in the alleged violation
because the state's legislature passed the challenged statute. 10 3
The state action doctrine, however, becomes increasingly
difficult to satisfy when it is unclear if the constitutional violator is
the state. For example, in the case of the private school that
racially discriminates, its constitutional insulation may be limited if
the state is somehow involved in the school's operations. 10 4 In
such a case, the private school may be viewed as the state through
some of the Supreme Court's theories on state action. Therefore,
the Constitution and its Amendments may be applicable to
restrain the private school's actions.
The distinction between a private and a state actor is critical
in determining if a plaintiff's constitutional rights have been
violated. Thus, the Supreme Court has created standards to guide
this inquiry and to define state action.
B. Defining State Action
The United States Supreme Court has identified a number of
situations that satisfy the state action requirement. There are four
main areas in which state action is found: (1) the private
performance of a public function; (2) a joint activity between a
state and a private party; (3) the state endorsement of private
conduct; and (4) the judicial enforcement of private agreements.
1. Private Performance of a Public Function
State action has been deemed to exist when a traditionally
exclusive public function is performed by a private individual.10 5
In other words, "if a state permits a private party to exercise what
is clearly a governmental power, then the activity of the private
party will be treated as state action for the purposes of the
102. See id. at 14.
103. See Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (finding that a state statute
mandating racial segregation in public schools automatically constituted state action
because the state passed the law requiring such action).
104. See Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
105. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
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Fourteenth Amendment. ' 10 6 In this sort of case, the individual's
constitutional insulation will disappear.
2. Joint Activity Between a State and a Private Party
The Constitution's requisite state action has also been
deemed to exist when there is a joint activity between the state and
a private party.10 7 If the state and a private individual act in
concert to cause a constitutional injury, the individual's act is
viewed as a state act.108 Therefore, the private individual will be
subject to the same restrictions under the Fourteenth Amendment
that are applicable against the state.
10 9
3. State Endorsement of Private Conduct
The third category of the state action doctrine places liability
on a private party when that party engages in state-endorsed
conduct.110 When a state endorses or encourages a private activity
that violates the Constitution, that private activity is then
transformed, in the eyes of the judiciary, into a public activity.
This transformation fulfills the state action requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
4. Judicial Enforcement of Private Agreements
The fourth category of state action, and the focal point of this
paper, is the judicial enforcement of private agreements. Under
certain circumstances, when a private party enforces an
agreement, contract, or judgment against another private party
through the judicial process, that enforcement will become state
action and the Constitution and its Amendments will be applicable
to the substance of the judgment. 111 This Comment asserts that
under this view of the state action doctrine, the United States
enforcement of an English libel judgment may create a situation in
which the very enforcement of the judgment makes the First
Amendment applicable to the substance of the judgment. If this
assertion is true, the Constitution would act to bar a state judicial
officer from infringing on a media defendant's First Amendment
106. See MAY & IDES, supra note 101, at 16.
107. See Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
108. See icL at 152.
109. See MAY & IDES, supra note 101, at 22.
110. See Reitmen v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
111. See Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
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freedoms. To substantiate this assertion, the United States
Supreme Court's rulings in this state action arena must be
explored further.
The leading case in this area is Shelley v. Kraemer.n 2 In
Shelley, the defendant, an African-American, purchased a piece of
residential property that was encumbered by a restrictive covenant
limiting the ownership of the property to people of the Caucasian
race.11 3 The plaintiff, a neighbor, sued the defendant to enjoin
him from possessing the property. Subsequently, the Supreme
Court of Missouri enforced the covenant and divested title from
the defendant.
114
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court recognized that
the discriminatory covenant did not itself violate the Fourteenth
Amendment since the agreement was between private parties.
11 5
The Shelley Court, however, concluded that the enforcement of
the covenant by a Missouri judicial officer brought the power of
the state into the transaction and that this state involvement was
sufficient to establish the presence of state action.11 6 The Supreme
Court found that the "action of state courts and judicial officers in
their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the state
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. 11 7 In other
words, judicial enforcement of the private agreement transformed
the racial discrimination effected by that agreement into state
action.
Logic suggests that the critical element in Shelley was the act
of judicial enforcement, the involvement of the state judiciary.
This logic, however, leads to a conclusion that any state court
decision creates state action. Therefore, all private agreements
and contracts would have to comply with the United States
Constitution.11 8 The Supreme Court, however, has rarely applied
Shelley in this manner.11 9 Thus, there is a critical element in the
facts of Shelley that has not been evident in later cases.
112. Id
113. Seeid at5.
114. See id. at 6.
115. See id. at 13 (stating that the "[First] Amendment erects no shield against merely
private conduct, however discriminatory or wrongful").
116. See id. at 19-20.
117. Id. at 14.




The state action theory, and Shelley in particular, is a very
convoluted doctrine, causing legal scholars and Supreme Court
Justices to disagree on what actually is the Shelley Court's
rationale.
An example of this confusion exists in Bell v. Maryland.120 In
Bell, the Supreme Court was asked to decide whether state action
was present when the Maryland judiciary convicted twelve
African-American students of trespassing on private property.
121
The students were arrested and charged with trespass as a result of
their sit-in demonstration in a privately owned restaurant that
refused to serve non-Caucasians. 122 The case was ultimately
remanded to the state court because of newly passed public
accommodation laws.123 However, some of the justices attacked
the question of whether state action was present when a private
individual used the state judiciary to enforce neutral trespass laws
in a discriminatory manner and how Bell compared to Shelley.
a. The Douglas View of Shelley v. Kraemer
Justice Douglas, in Bell v. Maryland, answered the question of
state action with simple logic and relied on Shelley to find the
requisite state action in Bell. Douglas stated that the "court
should put these restaurant cases in line with Shelley v. Kraemer,
holding that what the Fourteenth Amendment requires in
restrictive covenant cases it also requires from restaurants."
124
It seems that Justice Douglas did not consider the critical
element of Shelley to be so rare. Douglas believed that utilizing a
neutral trespass law to enforce a discriminatory act was enough to
satisfy the state action demands of the Fourteenth Amendment.
125
The trespass convictions in Bell, much like the enforcement of the
restrictive covenant in Shelley, placed the stamp of state action on
the discrimination, thereby making the constitutional restrictions
against racial discrimination applicable.
120. 378 U.S. 226 (1964).
121. See id. at 228.
122. Id.
123. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES & POLICIES
405 (1997).
124. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. at 259.
125. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 123, at 405.
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Although this interpretation of Shelley seems reasonable
because of the state's necessary involvement, the Supreme Court
has rarely taken such an encompassing view of Shelley.
126
Ordinarily, the mere involvement of the courts or the police to
settle a private dispute does not alone create state action, there
must be more.
127
Notably, however, the Supreme Court has selectively applied
the Douglas view of Shelley in some cases, while not applying it in
others. In Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.,128 for example, the
plaintiff, a private party, gave the defendant, a Minnesota
newspaper, scandalous court records concerning a candidate for
Lieutenant Governor in exchange for a promise of
confidentiality. 129 When the newspaper nevertheless exposed the
plaintiff's name in breach of the confidentiality agreement, the
plaintiff sued the paper on the theory of promissory estoppel.
130
The newspaper raised the defense that all its actions were shielded
by the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of press. The
plaintiff, however, argued that the First Amendment was
inapplicable because the case was merely a suit between private
parties, there was no state action.
131
In its state action discussion, the Court said, "[o]ur cases teach
that the application of state rules of law in state courts in a manner
alleged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes 'state
action' under the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 132 In an infrequent
invocation of Justice Douglas' view of Shelley, the Court held that,
"[t]hese legal obligations [promissory estoppel] would be enforced
through the official power of the Minnesota courts. Under our
cases, that is enough to constitute 'state action' for purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment."'
133
126. See id. at 404.
127. See id.
128. 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
129. See id. at 665.
130. See id at 666.





"As in Shelley, a court order restricting First Amendment
freedoms would itself violate the asserted Constitutional right.
'134
Therefore, the Cohen Court adopted the Douglas view by
asserting, although not explicitly, that the sole requirement for
state action is the mere involvement of the state judiciary.
b. Justice Black's View of Shelley v. Kraemer
Justice Black similarly attempted to define the critical
element of Shelley in his Bell dissent. Justice Black lashed out at
Douglas' view on Shelly by stating:
It seems pretty clear that the reason judicial enforcement of the
restrictive covenants in Shelley was deemed to be state action
was not merely the fact that a state court had acted, but rather
that it had acted 'to deny petitioners, on the grounds of race or
color, the enjoyment of property rights in premises which
petitioners are willing and financially able to acquire and which
the grantors are willing to sell.' 1
3 5
Justice Black focused on the effect of the judicial act as
opposed to the judicial act itself. In Shelley, the grantor of the
restricted property was willing to sell the property to an African-
American. 136  In other words, the grantor chose not to
discriminate against the buyer. According to Justice Black, the
state court's enforcement of the covenant forced the grantor to
discriminate on the basis of race by disallowing him to sell the
property to a willing minority buyer. Justice Black points out that
this was the critical element present in Shelley, and absent in Bell.
The restaurant owner, in Bell, was discriminating on his own
accord, whereas the land owner, in Shelly, was operating under the
hand of the state.
While this is a reasonable view of Shelley, it is also a
significantly narrow view. One can imagine very few situations,
other than facts identical to Shelley, in which state action could be
found under the Black view.
134. MAY & IDES, supra note 101, at 21.
135. Bell, 378 U.S. at 330 (Black, J., dissenting).
136. See Shelley, 334 U.S. at 5.
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c. The Public Policy View of Shelley v. Kraemer
A third and extremely plausible explanation for the Supreme
Court's ruling in Shelley focuses both on the common law of
restrictive covenants and Missouri's policy of enforcing these
covenants. This may be referred to as the public policy view of
Shelley.
At the time Shelley was decided, Missouri, like many other
states, viewed covenants restraining the alienability of real estate
as judicially unenforceable. 137  In simpler terms, Missouri
presumed that any private agreement hindering the free sale of
property was generally unenforceable. To enforce a restrictive
covenant, a Missouri court must first find that the substance of the
covenant is reasonable and that it is consistent with the public
policy of the state. 138
With this process in mind, the Missouri court that chose to
enforce the Shelley restrictive covenant must have decided that it
was consistent with Missouri's public policy to enforce a racially
discriminatory covenant. 139 "[R]acially restrictive covenants were
included by Missouri within the special subclass of restraints on
alienability which the state's courts would not set aside as
presumptively contrary to public policy." 140
Viewing Shelley from the public policy view, the Missouri
court, in its official representation of the state, endorsed racial
discrimination by enforcing the private covenant. In this sense, the
state placed itself in the shoes of the individuals drafting the
covenant because both tacitly agreed that the covenant was
consistent with Missouri's public policy. This agreement between
the drafters of the covenant and the state court collapsed the two
parties into one discriminating entity.
Thus, according to the public policy view of Shelley, neither
the act of judicial enforcement nor the forcing of a person to
discriminate created Shelley's requisite state action. Alternatively,
the Supreme Court found that the state court's decision that racial
discrimination was consistent with public policy placed the stamp
of state action on the private agreement, thereby making the
Fourteenth Amendment applicable to that agreement.
137. See RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 406 (1944).
138. See id.
139. See.LAURENCE H. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 263 (1985).
140. Id. (emphasis in original).
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If this were the critical element in Shelley, the state action
model created in that ruling would be applicable to any court
decision that considers whether a private agreement, contract or
judgment is consistent with public policy. At first glance, this view
seems extremely expansive because a violation of public policy
may be asserted during any contract enforcement hearing, a
common form of litigation. It must be remembered, however, that
a public policy violation is an affirmative defense in contract
law.141 Therefore, a person seeking to invalidate a contract on the
basis of public policy must actually raise this issue with the court.
Accordingly, the issue of public policy will not arise in every
contract enforcement hearing, as it does in restrictive covenant
cases. As a result, the public policy view of Shelley shrinks in
effect.
d. The Non-Neutral View of Shelley v. Kraemer
A fourth view of Shelley similarly focuses on the substantive
law of the enforcement of restrictive covenants as well as on the
actions of the Missouri court. This may be referred to as the non-
neutral view of Shelley.
As stated earlier, according to Missouri law a restrictive
covenant can only be enforced if it is deemed to not be an
unreasonable restriction on alienation.142 Thus, in enforcing the
Shelley covenant, the Missouri court must have decided that an
agreement to only sell property to Caucasians still presented a
reasonable opportunity for the owner to alienate his property. 143
On the other hand, if the restriction had prohibited the sale of
property to Caucasians, the Missouri court would have had to
strike the covenant down as an unreasonable restriction on
alienability because the purchaser pool would have only consisted
of African-Americans. This small purchaser pool would have
excluded a vast majority of probable purchasers, Caucasians,
141. An individual seeking to invalidate a contract on the basis of public policy must
actually make this argument to the court because it is an affirmative defense to the
enforcement of a contract. Therefore, the court places the burden of proof on the person
seeking to invalidate the contract. In only very limited circumstances is public policy not
an affirmative defense, meaning that the court must answer the question of public policy.
See WILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR. & LARY LAWRENCE, CONTRACTS AND SALES:
CASES AND PROBLEMS 308-09, 315-23 (1993).
142. See TRIBE, supra note 139, at 260.
143. This was probably true because Caucasians greatly outnumbered African-
Americans, leaving a vast number of probable purchasers for the restricted property.
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thereby leaving the property owner with little opportunity to
alienate his property. Undoubtedly, the Missouri court would
have found a Caucasian covenant to be an unreasonable restriction
on the alienability of property while enforcing a similar African-
American restriction.
Therefore, the non-neutral view of Shelley asserts that the
Missouri state court actually participated in racial discrimination
because it provided Caucasians with more opportunities to
purchase land than it did for African-Americans. Consistent with
this line of reasoning, the Supreme Court must have found that a
state could not chose to rubber stamp restrictive covenants against
African-Americans, while generally regarding alienability
restraints against Caucasians as unenforceable. 144 Thus, the non-
neutral view asserts that "[t]he real 'state action' in Shelley was
Missouri's facially discriminatory body of common and statutory
law-the quintessence of a racist state policy." 145
V. ATTRIBUTING STATE ACTION TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF
ENGLISH LIBEL JUDGMENTS IN AMERICA
The preceding section illustrates that it is not possible to
determine, for certain, what aspect of judicial enforcement creates
state action. It is possible, however, to apply the four varying
views of Shelley and make an educated guess as to what types of
judicial decrees will substantiate state action. This Comment
asserts that under some of the aforementioned views of Shelley,
the enforcement of an English libel judgment in the United States
is a type of judicial decree that constitutes state action.
A. Application of the Douglas View to the Enforcement of English
Libel Judgments in the United States
The Douglas view asserts that anytime the judiciary is
involved in the enforcement of a covenant, contract, or judgment
state action is created.146 In order to find state action in the
enforcement of an English libel judgment, this is the simplest and
most generous view.
144. See TRIBE, supra note 139, at 260.
145. Id.
146. See supra Part IV.B.4.a.
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To most plaintiffs, a libel judgment is meaningless if it is not
enforced. 147 When a plaintiff brings an English judgment to the
United States, the plaintiff seeks assistance from the United States
Judiciary because he or she could not sufficiently collect on the
judgment in England. 148 Therefore, to effectuate the judgment,
the United States Judiciary must intervene and employ its power
to force payment. This process is very similar to the one in Shelley,
where the restrictive covenant would have been ineffective unless
the Missouri court intervened in the private agreement and
enforced the covenant.
The parallel between Shelley and English libel judgments is
bolstered when the Cohen case' 49 is added into the equation.
Cohen appeared to be a case in which the Supreme Court
endorsed the Douglas view of Shelley within the context of the
First Amendment. 150 Finding state action, the Cohen Court
stated, "[o]ur cases teach that the application of state rules of law
in state courts in a manner alleged to restrict First Amendment
freedoms constitutes 'state action' under the Fourteenth
Amendment." 151 It is clear that, in the foreign judgment arena,
enforcement rules are state rules and the application of English
libel laws restricts First Amendment freedoms. Cohen adds
credence to the argument that the enforcement of these judgments
creates state action, making the enforcement of a judgment
attributable to the state and the Constitution applicable.
If the Douglas view is accepted, state action is present in the
enforcement of an English libel judgment and the First
Amendment is applicable to such judgments.
B. Application of the Black View to the Enforcement of English
Libel Judgments in the United States
According to Justice Black's view of Shelley, state action was
created because the Missouri court forced the grantor, a man
willing to sell his property to an African-American, to discriminate
on the basis of race.
152
147. Assuming that the main concern of the plaintiff is compensation for injuries
suffered.
148. See Suing American Media, supra note 1, at 235-38.
149. See Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991).
150. See supra Part IV.B.4.a.
151. Cohen, 501 U.S. at 668.
152 See supra Part IV.B.4.b.
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If this exclusive view of Shelley is accepted, the enforcement
of an English libel judgment in a United States court would not
create state action. In an enforcement case, the plaintiff is a
willing participant in the infringement on the defendant's First
Amendment freedoms, otherwise the plaintiff would not seek
enforcement. Therefore, the state, in enforcing the judgment, does
not compel anyone to violate a person's Constitutional liberties, as
Missouri did in Shelley.
State action, therefore, under the Black view, is not present in
the enforcement of English libel judgments, thereby making the
First Amendment inapplicable because the state is not involved in
the deprivation.
153
C. Application of the Public Policy View to the Enforcement of
English Libel Judgments in the United States
The public policy view of Shelley asserts that in upholding
Shelly's restrictive covenant, the Missouri court must have decided
that racial discrimination was not inconsistent with the state's
public policy. This policy decision placed the state in the shoes of
the covenant's drafters, making the state a willing participant in
the discrimination, thus creating state action.154
Under this view of Shelley, a creative argument can be made
that the enforcement of an English libel judgment is strikingly
similar to Shelley. As indicated in Section III of this Comment,
under the Supreme Court's Hilton ruling155 and the Recognition
Act, 156 a court must decide that a foreign judgment is not contrary
to the state's public policy before enforcing the judgment. If a
state court enforces an English libel judgment, therein deciding
that the substantive law used to create that judgment is not
inconsistent with the state's public policy, the state places its stamp
of approval on the judgment. This endorsement puts the state in
the shoes of the tribunal that applied the substantive law and the
state becomes involved in the deprivation of the defendant's First
Amendment freedoms. As a result, state action is created.
153. See supra Part IV.B.4.b. It is hard to imagine facts, other than those in Shelley, in
which "state action" would be present under the Black view.
154. See supra Part IV.B.4.c.
155. See Hilton,159 U.S. 113 (1895).




Under the public policy view of Shelley, the enforcement of
an English libel judgment creates sufficient state action to make
the United States Constitution applicable to the private quarrel.
D. Application of the Non-Neutral View to the Enforcement of
English Libel Judgments in the United States
The non-neutral view of Shelley asserts that the Missouri
State court was actually involved in the discrimination because it
provided Caucasians with more opportunities to purchase land
than it did African-Americans.
157
Under this view, it is difficult to find state action without
knowing the exact procedures and actions of the individual states
in the enforcement of English libel judgments. If it can be shown
that a state favors some defendants over others or a state enforces
libel judgments regarding some types of speech while refusing to
enforce libel judgments concerning other types of speech, then it
may be possible to find state action under the non-neutral view.
This finding, however, would probably lead to other constitutional
violations 158 as opposed to a First Amendment violation.
Accordingly, state action may only be found in the
enforcement of English libel judgments, under the non-neutral
view of Shelley if certain facts are present.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Shelley v. Kraemer presents
several plausible theories concerning the creation of state action.
It is unclear which theory is actually correct. What is clear,
however, is that if state action is found in the enforcement of an
English libel judgment, perhaps under the Douglas or public policy
view, the United States Constitution is violated.
The Supreme Court struck down the English libel principles
years ago because of their infringement on First Amendment
freedoms. 159 The First Amendment would once again be strangled
if the same discarded principles were attributable to the action of a
157. See supra Part IV.B.4.d.
158. If it could be shown that a state was favoring one defendant over another, then
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment would probably be applicable
rather than the First Amendment. This Comment, however, will not attempt to decipher
the Supreme Court's Equal Protection analysis.
159. See supra Part lI.B.
19991
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
state, which is what the state action theory accomplishes. If state
action is found in the enforcement of English libel judgments, the
First Amendment demands that each and every state refuse to
enforce these judgments.
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